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This article discusses the cause-effects of African conflicts and suggests ways of 
mitigating them. The central argument being that the capacity of African states to 
effectively respond to the critical socio-economic needs of its citizens is on the decline. 
As such poverty, illiteracy, unemployment, insecurity and corruption is on the rise. 
The article also highlights the negative influence of ethnicity in degenerative state 
politics. Culture has become an identifier in the society – state nexus with negative 
consequences in which some groups are marginalized while others are favoured on the 
basis of ethnic identity. The study used Collier and Hoeffler’s risk model analysis in 
conceptualizing the arguments. In summary, conflict mitigation incorporates enhancing 
development as an aspect of security. Securitization of development implies using 
development to secure the people within the state. 
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Introduction 
The 1990s introduced profound shifts in 
the realm of peace and security in Africa. 
With the demise of the Cold War, the East-
West tension eased considerably. South 
Africa and Namibia installed 
democratically elected governments. 
Mozambique achieved relative peace and 
stability after decades of warring struggles 
(Rugummamu and Osman 2003). 
 
Many other African countries conducted 
democratic elections. These developments 
indeed reflected positive steps to peace. 
However, whereas many parts of the world 
moved closer to peace, stability and 
development, Africa remained quite 
unstable (Rugummamu and Osman 2003). 
 
Political insecurity and protracted violence 
have increasingly marked the African 
continent. Ironically, the continent’s 
institutional and organizational capacity to 
mitigate these conflicts has not developed 
at the same pace as the escalation of 
conflict. Within this realm, peace and 
peacemaking in Africa emerge as critical 
issues in global politics (Rugummamu and 
Osman 2003). 
 
The societal conflicts in Africa have 
always been made complex by poverty, 
illiteracy and weak systems of governance. 
The capacity of many states in Africa to 
adequately respond to the critical social 
needs of the citizens has equally declined. 
This is what Rugumamu (2001) refers to 
as traumatic episodes of collapsed and 
fragile states.1 
 
The State Nexus and Conflicts 
 
Evidently state collapses are outcomes of 
long term degenerative politics 
characterized by a loss of control over the 
economic and political space. This 
phenomenon of state collapse has 
consequent effect on neighboring 
countries. The displacement of refugees, 
increased ethnic tension, diplomatic 
conflicts, has engaged significant 
resources and efforts from relatively stable 
states that border them (Zartman 1995). 
 
The aim of conflict prevention then 
becomes one of reducing the likelihood of 
specific conflicts becoming, or continuing 
                                               
1 “Fragile State” are understood to be countries 
facing latent or protracted conflict (including 
situations of war), countries emerging from conflict 
(with major uncertainties as to their future stability) 
and countries directly affected by regional 
conflicts.  Their “fragility” can take different 
forms.  In the extreme cases, state structures have 
disappeared.  In other cases, the central state may 
appear strong (e.g. in terms of military control), but 
lacks legitimacy, controls only part of the national 
territory or fails to deliver even the most basic 
services (including in developmental terms).  The 
net result is generally a situation of chronic 
instability, insecurity, violation of human rights, 
economic and social collapse, high levels of aid 
dependency and rising levels of absolute poverty 
(Rugumamu 2001) 
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to be physically violent (Goodhand and 
Hulme 1999).  Variously called, conflict, 
or complex political emergencies, they 
may be characterized by such features; 
first, they take place within or across state 
boundaries. Essentially, the conflict may 
originate within a particular state, they 
easily have spillover effects. 
 
Secondly, these situations are mostly 
political in nature. The struggles and 
competition for power and valued scarce 
resources is quite significant in social 
conflicts. Third, conflicts tend to have 
multiple and interconnected causes. 
Fourth, they are protracted in nature. Fifth, 
they are embedded and are expressions of 
cleavages in existing social, political, 
economic and cultural differences and 
finally conflicts involve predatory social 
formations. These formations may take the 
form of ethno-nationalism where groups 
are mobilized and violently manipulated 
by conflict entrepreneurs and political 
leaders (Goodhand and Hulme 1999). 
 
Ethnic nationalism and state centered 
nationalism thus manifests a form of 
identity formation, conceptualized as the 
process of intensifying the subjective 
meanings of a multiplicity of symbols and 
of striving to achieve multisymbol 
congruence among a group of people 
defined initially by one or more central 
symbols, whether those symbols are ethnic 
attributes or loyalty to a particular stat 
(Brass 1991). Nationalism emerges as a 
reaction to objective exploitation of an 
indigenous group by an alien group, or by 
one social class by another (Chong – do 
Har and Jeffrey Martin 1975). 
 
Barth’s anthropological view of ethnicity 
emphasizes its contextual, circumstantial, 
and situational dimensions (1969). Thus 
identity emerges through particular 
economic, political and social conditions 
and is a product of the context in which an 
individual finds himself/herself. Ethnic 
identity is therefore adaptive and 
voluntaristic (Davis 1996). 
 
The reality of contemporary issues 
associated with identity has called for new 
re-conceptualization of culture and identity 
which stresses “social constructedness as 
opposed to primordialism, optionality as 
opposed to determinism, fragmentation 
and diversification as opposed to 
integration and homogenization, and 
multidimensionality and dynamism as 
opposed to static unidimentionality (Lapid 
1996). 
 
Within this background, states could be 
viewed though as critical pillars of global 
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as well as territorial constructions of 
various identities, they are not 
homogenous bodies but “collectivities full 
of people with multiple identities and 
loyalties” (Krause and Renwick 1996). It 
is true too, that at sub nation state levels 
“identities are constructed and can, 
therefore be deconstructed and 
reconstructed anew” (Krause and Renwick 
1996). 
 
This phenomenon of nation building was 
quite evident in post-colonial state in 
Africa, where construction and 
reconstruction of identities occurred in a 
climate of instability and violence. 
Emerging conflicts in Africa, therefore 
assume competing loyalties where 
disaffection of or among groups/identities 
find solace in ethnic or “tribal” bonds as 
alternative forms of solidarity to their 
perceived insecurity (Malaquias 2007).  
“Ethnicity” retains its potency as a focus 
of identification in the absence of strong 
legitimate alternative identities (Davies 
1996). 
 
Accommodation, tolerance and coping 
capacities of the poor, marginalized, 
excluded are enormously taxing. This is 
due to the fact that conflicts do engender 
violent destruction of structural conditions 
particularly through authoritarian rule and 
absence of political rights, state weakness 
and ineffective institutional capacity to 
mitigate conflict (Rugumamu and Osman 
2003). 
 
The risk factors for an outbreak of 
violence becomes high when these 
conditions are exacerbated by other 
problems, such as manipulation of ethnic 
or other social issues (in religion, culture 
and language). These have the effect of 
fragmenting society thereby intensifying 
conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 1999, 
Colleta and Cullen 2000). 
 
Primordialism provides a reinforcing 
perception where individuals entertain 
stereotypes about others.  They therefore 
see opponents negatively and impute 
malicious motives.  In this way, a conflict 
map is elevated to serve as a conceptual 
guide to clarify the nature and dynamics of 
a conflict (Wehr 1995 and Rugumamu 
2001). 
 
With the escalation of conflict into 
violence, the critical concern of 
neighboring states, civil society and the 
United Nations is to step in and facilitate 
the one direction process and transform 
structures that trigger insecurity and 
structural violence into positive peace 
(Galtung 1995). 
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Johan Galtung further clarifies that 
absence of violence among groups may 
not necessarily imply peace. He describes 
this conception as “negative peace”, 
suggesting that underlying points of 
conflict must themselves be resolved in 
order for true peace1 to exist (1995). 
Mahatma Gandhi suggested that if an 
oppressive society lacks violence, the 
society is nonetheless not peaceful, 
because of the injustice of the oppression. 
Gandhi posited a vision of peace in which 
justice is an inherent and necessary aspect; 
that peace requires not only the absence of 
violence but also the presence of justice. 
Galtung described this peace, peace with 
justice, as “positive peace” (1995). True 
peace, therefore, is not merely the absence 
of tension; it is the presence of justice. 
Galtung thus coined the term structural 
violence to explain such situations, which 
although not violent on the surface, habour 
systematic oppression and injustice (1995). 
 
Proponents of democratic peace theory 
emphasize that empirical evidence exists 
that democracies never or rarely make war 
                                               
1 Johan Galtung makes a clear distinction between 
“positive” and “negative” peace.  Positive peace 
encompasses an ideal of how society should be.  It 
requires that not only all types of violence be 
minimal or non-existent, but also that the major 
potential causes of future conflict be removed.  The 
notion of negative peace is defined as the end of 
widespread violent conflict associated with war.  It 
may include prevalent social violence ad structural 
violence.  For details see Galtung (1995; 1998) 
against each other. Though critics dispute 
this observation, emphasizing other factors 
as wealth, power and stability are equally 
important 
(http:/en.wikipedia.org/wiki/peace). 
 
It should be noted that conflicts in which 
the state is an effective arbiter do not 
create particular difficulties, since a 
mitigating framework could be achieved. 
The problem emerges, when the state itself 
is a party to the conflict, since under such 
conditions, external intervention becomes 
necessary (Rugumamu and Osman 2003). 
Furthermore, institutions that are internally 
consistent have the lowest risk of breading 
down, since such institutions are self-
reinforcing. In an emerging democracy, 
this implies a wide distribution of power 
and inclusiveness in the political system 
(Collier 2003). 
 
Strategic partnership forged between 
government, private sector and civil 
society is critical to successful post-
conflict reconstruction in order to prevent 
recidivism to violent conflict. Since the 
end of the Cold War, nearly half of 
African countries have experienced some 
type of conflict, mostly in the low-income 
ones (UNAIDS 2003). This indicates a 
link between poverty and conflict. 
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Protracted violent conflicts continue to 
affect millions of women, men, boys and 
girls, communities, businesses and even 
the legitimacy of government. In the case 
of Somalia, the entire government 
machinery collapsed. In some countries 
conflict is still active, in others it is 
dormant. In other countries, such as 
Liberia, Sierra Leone and DRC are 
characterized by periods of activity and 
dormancy. 
 
Put differently, while other regions enjoy 
relative peace and economic growth and 
prosperity, Africa, for most part, is 
entangled in incessant conflict, largely 
internal and general economic malaise. 
Violent conflict is simply a major 
constraint to development in Africa.   
 
It is therefore within this realization that 
issues of peace, security and good 
governance have taken a center stage in 
the new development framework for 
Africa. This was at the forefront of 
discussions in many fora in Africa. The 
challenge here is on how to find long 
lasting solutions to Africa’s seemingly 
intractable conflicts that will go beyond 
mere halting of hostilities to incorporate 
post-conflict reconstruction, rehabilitation 
and reintegration (UNAIDS 2003). 
 
At a conference of Committee on Human 
Development and Civil Society and 
UNAIDS held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in 
May 2003, it was observed that most of 
Africa’s conflicts have been recursive not 
lease because solutions have been 
truncated and short-sighted leaving out the 
full range of conflict resolution 
mechanisms, which must include post-
conflict reconstruction (UNAIDS 2003). 
 
The efforts to rebuild the livelihoods in 
societies from civil wars into relative 
peace are critical in order to prevent 
recidivism into violent conflict. Post-
conflict reconstruction eases the transition 
to sustainable peace after hostilities have 
reduced and supports socio-economic 
development (CHDCS 2003). This 
exercise/task is beyond the capacity of 
unilateral actors, whether 
intergovernmental, governmental or civil 
society. It is a process that relies on a 
partnership between many actors acting in 
a concerted effort. 
 
Essentially all stakeholders need to engage 
in reforming political, economic and social 
relationships if the process is to succeed. 
Therefore areas of complementarities 
between the entities should be sought 
(CHDCS 2030). 
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The African Union had adopted measures 
in establishing organs to facilitate 
prevention and resolution with the 
renewed spirit of New Partnership for 
Africa’s Development (NEPAD) that 
guarantees space for citizens’ participation 
(Elbadawi 2000). This novel idea requires 
guidelines and lessons from successful 
cases that would direct future post-conflict 
activities. 
 
It is imperative that the nature, origins and 
impact of current armed conflicts 
internationally be fully understood before 
attempts are made towards formulation for 
integration, peace building and 
reconstruction to avoid refueling the 
conflict. 
 
Elbadawi (2000) observes that the 
common recurring focus in the studies on 
causes of African conflicts has been 
ethnicity and religion. This theme gained 
frequency because most of African 
conflicts have ethnic and religious 
coloration. Notwithstanding this, recent 
literature demonstrates that such an 
assertion is simplistic and that as opposed 
to this belief, Africa’s civil wars are not 
due to ethnic and religious diversity. 
Rather, most conflicts in Africa are 
attributed to high levels of poverty failed 
political institutions and economic 
dependence on natural resources. 
 
Adedeji (1999) argues that poverty and the 
underlying competition for resources is at 
the heart of conflict. For example in 
Angola, the struggle for control of oil and 
diamond producing areas was the source 
of the conflict. Therefore the struggle for 
political power in many African countries 
is essentially the struggle to acquire 
control over resources and the means of 
production. 
 
Bigambe et al (2000) underscore the fact 
that the lower the per capita GDP the 
higher the likelihood of civil wars. There 
is little doubt therefore, that there is a 
direct correlation between civil strife and 
poverty. Put differently, poverty or lack of 
alternative economic opportunities is one 
of three major policy-related risk factors 
that can lead to conflict or re-start conflict. 
 
Further, poor governance, disrespect of the 
rule of law, social exclusion and 
intolerance have been at the core or many 
civil wars in Africa. In a number of cases 
in Africa are characterized by situations 
where political leaders find it difficult to 
abide by democratic principles of 
tolerance, encouraging participatory 
development, to refrain from violence and 
use intimidation as a means of resolving 
domestic conflicts (UNAIDS 2003). 
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The recursive nature of conflicts has 
energized focus on the multiple challenges 
of rebuilding countries emerging from 
conflict. The cessation of hostilities does 
not mean the end of a conflict. The 
transition process from war to peace 
involves not only overcoming the 
structural causes that initially sparked the 
fighting, but also effectively mitigating 
ongoing conflict and dealing with the 
legacies of conflict, which characterize the 
challenges of the post-conflict situation 
(UNAIDS 2003). 
 
The challenges are multivarious, where 
security of the individual and respect for 
basic human rights is thus the pillar of 
political and economic stabilization. 
Achieving these, requires the rebuilding of 
credible institutions at the central as well 
as at the local and community levels as 
they will have determining influence on 
the entire/whole process of reconstruction, 
beginning from the restoration of 
productive sectors of the economy, the 
return of capital to disarmament (UNAIDS 
2003). 
 
The key issues in reconstruction, as many 
scholars argue, include, first, 
infrastructural recovery, including water, 
sanitation, shelter and transportation; 
secondly, food security and agricultural 
rehabilitation, including land tenure 
designation and registration; thirdly, 
urgent health, education and basic social 
welfare requirements including 
employment and income generation and 
finally demobilization and reintegration, 
which takes priority in the peace process 
because security must be enhanced, the 
rule of law promoted, development 
stimulated and refugees repatriated 
(UNAIDS 2003). 
 
Human Development and Civil society 
HDCS) underscored the fact that 
rebuilding bridges of communication 
between social groups and promoting 
participation in political life is therefore a 
necessary but daunting challenge for social 
reconstruction. In this context, post-
conflict reconstruction policy must 
deliberately foster the re-emergence of 
civil society (2003). 
 
The process of reconstruction is so 
monumental that is certainly beyond the 
capacity of any single entity. Various 
stakeholders are crucial through a 
partnership predicated upon identifying 
and recognizing the challenges of post-
conflict situation, sorting out comparative 
advantages and synergizing, staking out 
mutual responsibilities and accountabilities 
(UNAIDS 2003). 
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According to the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Africa 
(UNECA), demonstrates how post-conflict 
partnerships impact on peace, uses the case 
in Liberia. In 1989, Liberia witnessed a 
wave of armed insurrection by rebel 
forces. This was to mark seven years of 
factional fighting. With the termination of 
fighting in 1996 though still intermittent 
outbursts continued. Civil Society 
organizations were involved in 
administering relief and brokering peace 
alongside their sub-regional, regional and 
international partners (1999). 
 
The protracted civil war ravaged Liberia’s 
agricultural and industrial productivity.  
As a result, the requirements for 
reconstruction were immense, beyond any 
single actor.  Consequently, NGOs 
participated in conducting peace building 
through community development, 
rehabilitation and reconstruction (UNECA 
1999). They facilitated micro-projects to 
help rehabilitate, repatriate, reconstruct 
and rebuild. The Monrovia based Centre 
for Democratic Empowerment (CDE) 
strongly led a campaign in support of 
disarmament and demobilization of former 
fighters. Also CDE facilitated meetings, 
workshops and conferences targeting 
women, children, traditional leaders and 
leaders in government and civil society 
(UNECA 1999). 
 
Similarly, Mozambique’s experience in 
post-conflict exigencies that led to civil 
war in the 1980s shows how the civil 
society played a leading role in nurturing 
an environment for sustained peace. The 
Mozambican Association for Rural 
Development (AMODER) promotes the 
improvement of living conditions for rural 
communities and to enhance their level of 
food security. Primarily, AMODER 
mobilized resources for credit support 
services and institutional capacity 
building. AMODER continued to support, 
credit concessions, to small-scale rural 
traders and enterprises and rehabilitation 
of commercial and productive 
infrastructures1. 
 
In the South Eastern Europe, conflict had 
also had a remarkable economic impact. It 
took the effort of the East West Institute 
(EWI) to initiate a working relationship 
between governments, private sectors to 
contribute to the stabilization and 
economic revitalization of South Eastern 
Europe. The efforts of Action Network for 
South Eastern Europe (ANSEE), EWI 
launched a task force on economic 
strategy, which intended to mobilize the 
                                               
1 For a deeper insight into the role of CSOs in 
micro-financing, see ILO, the Evolution of 
Microfinance in a successful Post-Conflict 
Transition: The case of Mozambique document 
prepared for the joint ILO/UNHCR workshop, 
Geneva, September 1999. 
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private sector efforts for post-economic 
reconstruction in the region. The task force 
provided a blueprint on stimulating 
domestic and foreign investments 
(UNECA 1999). 
 
Post Conflict Reconstruction 
 
A World Bank study, a framework for 
World Bank involvement in Post-Conflict 
Reconstruction (1997), identifies country 
conflict as one that has in the recent past 
witnessed widespread violence.  In such 
cases, the state is preoccupied in armed 
struggle, the state has failed or a 
significant part of the population is 
engaged in armed struggle with the state. 
 
Consequently, the World Bank report 
argues that external agencies to understand 
the history and the reasons for failure in 
order to design informed intervention 
strategies (1997). The aim of these 
intervention mechanisms is to facilitate the 
transition from war to sustainable peace, 
support the resumption of economic and 
social development, and determine at what 
point in the post-conflict process is a 
particular country judged to have achieved 
a relative state of normalcy. The World 
Bank proposed benchmarks for evaluating 
the progress to normalcy to include; 
macroeconomic stability and its likely 
sustainability; recovery of private sector 
confidence, as measured by the investment 
ratio; and the effectiveness with which 
institutional arrangements and the political 
system are coping with the tensions, 
schisms and behaviors that lay behind the 
conflict to begin with (World Bank 1998). 
 
This report however generalizes the 
evolution toward normalcy and the 
benchmarks for evaluating progress 
remain contentious. Furthermore, the 
nature of conflicts differs, inter alia, in 
duration, in the intensity and scope of 
destruction. So is the military strength and 
political strength of opponents and the 
degree to which the middle and upper 
classes are affected by hostilities. Whereas 
the conflicts is Uganda and Sierra Leone 
were products of state failure due to 
predatory or ineffectual governance, the 
erosion of the Rwandan state was a 
product of ethnic-cum-regional conflict 
and the Mozambican state’s failure was 
due to ideological conflict. 
 
Post-conflict reconstruction, like post-
natural disaster reconstruction, is 
concerned with repairing and 
reconstructing the physical and economic 
infrastructure and also aims at rebuilding 
weakened institutions. Reconstruction 
incorporates jump-starting the economy, 
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reconstructing the framework for 
democratic governance, rebuilding and 
maintaining key social infrastructure and 
planning for financial normalization 
(Rugumamu and Osman 2003). 
Reconstruction is necessitated by the fact 
that civil war alters both the level and the 
structure of economic activity in ways 
which persist beyond the war (World 
Bank, 1998; Colletta and Cullen 2000). 
 
The devastation of human, social and 
physical capital that characterize post-
conflict phase through peace agreements, 
require a paradigm shift for diagnosing 
and prescribing policy interventions which 
should be conflict mitigating (World Bank 
1998). Capacity building needs to be 
addressed at three levels: individual, 
institutional and societal. The three layers 
of capacity are mutually interdependent to 
the extent that any post-conflict 
reconstruction should embrace them 
(Browne 2002). 
 
At the individual level, capacity building 
target to enable individuals learn skills that 
build knowledge in a continuous process 
and extending these further in search of 
new opportunities. Institutionally, capacity 
building involves building existing 
capacities, rather than trying to construct 
new and alien ones. It aims to seek 
existing initiatives, however nascent and 
encourages these to grow. Finally at the 
societal level, capacity building targets 
facilitatory process of opening and 
widening of opportunities that allow 
people to maximize their capacities to the 
fullest (Browne 2002). Social capital and 
cohesion are the pillars of societal capacity 
and apply both nationally and locally. 
 
Browne therefore summarizes the concept 
of capacity building in reconstruction as 
comprising various processes. Broadly, 
first, is creating new capacities (Capacity 
creation), second is effectively mobilizing 
and utilizing existing capacities (Capacity 
utilization) and finally, sustaining the 
created capacity over time (Capacity 
retention).  
 
Peace building 
 
Collier (2003) observes that peace-
building processes towards reconstructing 
war-torn societies involve “triple 
transition”; a security transition from war 
to peace; a political transition from 
authoritarianism to a more participatory 
form of government; and a socio-economic 
reconstruction. These are reinforced by 
enabling environment in which there is 
citizen security, the rule of law, equitable 
distribution of resources, functioning 
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markets, responsive governance, an active 
civil society and basic trust among 
national actors. 
 
Though Collier (2003) sets clear the key 
ingredients in peace-building, expectations 
of what can be achieved remain unrealistic 
with regard to transferring democratic 
capacities, estimating the time it will take 
to realize goals, and determining rational 
mechanisms and structures of effective 
policy dialogue with different national 
actors. Khadiagala (1995) observes, 
conceptually, post-conflict peace building 
usually deals with rejuvenating 
institutional mechanisms that previously 
defined consistency to state action, 
legitimizing power, nurturing social trust 
and enabling the state to assume center of 
political life. This, Khadiagala argues 
extends to national and local authorities 
(through inclusiveness and transparency). 
 
Foltz (1995) identifies six basic elements 
as important in peace building; first, 
reestablishment of the state’s control over 
the means of coercion (military, police and 
security) throughout the territory to secure 
security. This entails thorough reform of 
the security sector and urgent phased 
demobilization and reintegration program 
of former combatants. Secondly, 
reestablishing the state’s fiscal capacity; 
third; restoring macroeconomic 
management capacity, fourth; developing a 
functioning judiciary, fifth; decentralizing 
decision making and expenditure authority 
and finally improving governance and 
transparency. 
 
Foltz (1995), basic elements failed to 
answer such basic questions as who and 
what has to be protected and for whom. 
Ultimately argues Abramovitz (1996), the 
effectiveness of international interventions 
to development largely depends on internal 
conditions. 
 
The point is that for peace to be attained in 
any society, the citizens must be “trained” 
by the concerned agents, particularly the 
government, if they are to meet society 
requirements. The lack of a 
legitimate/recognized government as in the 
case of Somalia has the effect of 
compromising security. For at the heart of 
government’s legal existence is the 
consent of the governed, which can only 
be achieved through an 
acceptable/prescribed form i.e. elections. 
The absence of elections (read periodic 
elections) in Somalia leads to the crucial 
issue of:  Under whose authority is the 
interim government of Somalia ruling? It 
is this question of authority and legitimacy 
that contributes the general lawlessness in 
Somalia (for the so-called-government) is 
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unable to impose its values/beliefs upon its 
subject population. 
 
The work of Thomas Hobbes “Leviathan” 
can also provide the much-needed insight 
into the issue of security or insecurity 
thereof. Hobbes argues that man’s passion 
for war is stronger but the negative 
consequences of war make men to reason 
(for emphasis) and seek peace. Could it be 
that the conflict situation in Somalia is due 
to the absence of “reason” among the 
major players in the conflict? Arguably, is 
it possible that the major players in the 
conflict are yet to recognize the adverse 
effects of the conflict thus their non-
chalant attitude towards peace? With time, 
may be months or even years, the “conflict 
perpetuators will “apply reason”, come 
together, and seek peace as happened in 
Sudan (between the Khartoum government 
and the SPLA), or even Angola following 
the defeat and death of the Jonas Savimbi 
led guerrilla movement.  
 
Conflict is primarily attributable to 
resource scarcity and distribution, be it 
economic, social or political. Scarcity and 
skewed distribution of resources may lead 
to frustration among the disadvantaged 
groups with the resultant effect being 
insecurity as each group/individual try to 
increase their “share of gratification” 
within the political system.   
 
Karl Marx argued that conflict is an 
inevitable and pervasive feature of a social 
system and it manifests itself in the 
opposition of interests. According to Marx, 
every society is divided into two dominant 
classes of the owing and non-owing thus 
underlining the unequal distribution of 
scarce resources within society. 
Antagonism becomes a constant factor in a 
society’s development that gives rise to 
structural changes that aim at the 
redistribution of resources.  
 
Waltz (2001) in his work “Man, the state 
and war” aptly captures the argument that 
war is traceable to human nature and 
behavior. The natural order is when people 
or individuals resort to violence within, 
between and among themselves. It is 
through war that man’s frustrations find an 
escape-root.  
 
The more intense the conflict, the more 
benefits accrued to the “selfish 
individuals”.  Such individual (read 
warlords and their followers) will employ 
violence, insecurity mainly for self-
preservation while benefiting the 
manufactures of weapons of destruction 
and their agents. Benefits come in the form 
of consistent profit flows.  
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It is increasingly common to view security 
in an all encompassing manner, 
particularly in the post-9/11 world. 
Development is one important domain that 
has been merged and subjected to security 
concerns (Duffield 2001). 
 
What became “securitization of 
development” was more visible in the 
1990s as far as the internal armed conflict 
in poorer countries and escalating crime 
and violence in developing and rapidly 
urbanizing economies. Many arguments 
raised by scholars underscored the 
correlation between economic inequality, 
underdevelopment and poor governance 
with armed conflict and crime. Tony Blair 
declared in 2004: “We know that poverty 
and instability lead to weak states which 
can become havens for terrorists and other 
criminals ….. Even before 9/11, al-Qaeda 
had bases in Africa …… They still do, 
hiding in places where they can go 
undisturbed by weak governments, 
planning their next attacks which could be 
anywhere in the world, including Africa.” 
(Tony Blair quoted in Mail and Guardian 7 
October 2004). 
 
Whereas underdevelopment could trigger 
armed conflicts, the consequences of 
conflict become more glaring in terms of 
missed development opportunities, 
disintegration and failing states. Menkhaus 
(2004) calls it the “vicious circle 
metaphor” evident in, for example the 
World Bank’s notion of the “conflict trap” 
(World Bank 2003) – obliges development 
institutions to systematically integrate 
crime prevention, conflict resolution and 
post-conflict reconstruction, 
demobilization, security reforms and good 
governance into development interventions 
(UNRISD 1995, OECD/DAC 1997, World 
Bank 1998, Danida 2004). 
 
The concept of security has equally 
undergone changes. It has been broadened 
to the extent that the idea of “human 
security” implies that a number of basic 
human needs have been viewed as being 
indispensable for the survival of an 
individual (UNDP 1994).  Human security 
rests on the safety of the citizens and a 
sovereignty that is based on a state’s 
respect for the rights of its citizens 
(Duffield 2004). 
 
Such conceptual and institutional changes 
call for a rethinking of the concepts of 
development and security. This 
necessitates a thorough investigation of the 
effects of these changes (Jensen and Finn 
2007).   
 
While acknowledging that power works 
through the social organization of space in 
different “territorializing regimes” (Wilson 
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2004), it is less surprising that the 
production of spaces and boundaries 
represents a continuous linkage between 
development – security from the colonial 
times to the present. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Put differently, when people’s ideas are 
valued differently and endowed in terms of 
capacities for development, self-
determination and decency combine with 
strategic designs for the containment and 
control of danger and threat, we tend to get 
a “police concept of history” i.e. the 
production of a visual dichotomy of ideal, 
safe spaces and dystrophic, risk-laden 
spaces that impinge on and threaten safe 
spaces (Feldman 2004).  As De Certeau 
(1984) posits, this division of space 
between civilized “proper places” and 
unruly (barbarian) environment that can be 
made subject of surveillance from proper 
places, is a constant figure of strategic 
thinking in military, political and business 
circles. 
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